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SPACE-BASED WEAPONS
Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives
Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy
The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan released in November 2003 re-invigorated the debate on the issue of space weaponization. Taking a “snap-
shot in time” of that service’s ongoing and future transformation efforts, the
Transformation Flight Plan lays out current programs, advanced concept tech-
nology demonstrations, and “future system concepts.”1 Many of the systems de-
scribed can be interpreted as a significant move by the United States toward
weaponization of space. As Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.) pointed out during a
recent hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee, “putting weapons either offensive or defensive into space is a
major policy decision.”2 This decision will require thorough discussion and
analysis to ensure that American system deployments not only provide the
short-term benefits promised by service advocates but
contribute to increased security in the long term.
This article addresses one component of the debate
on whether or not to weaponize space. Specifically, it
looks at whether a decision to base weapons in space
would produce a net, long-term increase in relative
military capability for the United States or serve to re-
duce its current military dominance. It defines
“space-based weapon” as a system placed in orbit or
deep space that is designed “for destroying, damaging,
rendering inoperable, or changing the flight trajec-
tory of space objects, or for damaging objects in the
atmosphere or on the ground.”3
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U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan has several program concepts that
include space-basing of weapons. The Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser
Engagement (EAGLE) concept will use “airborne, terrestrial, or space-based la-
sers in conjunction with space-based relay mirrors to project different laser
powers and frequencies to achieve a broad range of effects from illumination to
destruction.”4 Another, the Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon, will
“be a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmit-
ters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of elec-
tronics and national-level command and control systems . . . typically . . . used as a
non-kinetic anti-satellite weapon.”5 A third, “hypervelocity rod bundles,” would
“provide the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from
space.”6 While other system concepts and programs Flight Plan describes are less
specific on the point, there seems little doubt that space-basing of weapons is an
accepted aspect of the Air Force transformation planning. Now, therefore, is the
time to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of basing weapons in space—
in the end, either endorsing or recommending revision to this space-basing
assumption.
In the event, this analysis indicates that space-based weapons, though in the
short term increasing military capabilities, are in the long term very likely to
have a negative effect on the national security of the United States. Specifically, I
will argue, the vulnerabilities of space-based systems would largely negate their
projected advantages. Further, potential enemies would react to U.S. deploy-
ments, either avoiding their effects or, more ominously, space-basing weapons
of their own. These deployments would fundamentally reduce the current rela-
tive advantages the United States enjoys in conventional forces and strategic
depth—reducing the time and distance in which effective defenses must be cre-
ated. Arguments for the necessity of space-basing weapons are politically unten-
able, based on false assumptions, or narrowly focused on space-centric concepts
that fail to integrate and take full advantage of capabilities of terrestrially based
forces. Finally, I will propose a balanced policy and strategy that should optimize
maintenance of relative advantages while hedging against uncooperative
adversaries.
HIGH GROUND OR SITTING DUCK?
Space is frequently referred to as the “ultimate high ground.” While few would
dispute that space provides an excellent vantage point, “high ground” implies a
great deal more, and in fact space is far from being the “ultimate high ground.”
On earth, high ground has physical resources near at hand for shielding and hiding
behind. In space, the “high ground” has nothing: it’s a vacuum and there is nothing
there that you don’t bring with you. On earth, high ground is often a peak with a
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castle on it like the Krak des Chevaliers, a choke point, a symbol of power. In the
“high ground” of space, you’re a thin-skinned sitting duck with a bull’s-eye painted
on your side. Anybody has a chance to shoot at you whenever they feel like it. High
ground on earth provides you with a view of everything below you, while the people
down below can’t see you, because you’re up over the edge of the fortification. In
space, everybody can see you and people on the ground can hide from you, so all
those advantages are gone. On earth, from high ground you can strike anywhere
around you while those below are limited in reaching you. In space, the attacks that
you might make, the trajectories that your vehicles might follow, follow paths that
are predictable in advance, predictable in both space and time. Ground attacks,
meanwhile, on a point in space can be almost random; they are highly variable in
time and space and are unpredictable. On earth, on the high ground, you have weap-
ons that are more effective when you aim downward, but the “high ground” in space
is the easier target, being unprotected. Attacking uphill involves difficulty and delay
on the ground but in space, uphill and downhill attacks take about the same amount of
time and your “high ground” is very much harder to resupply and rearm. Lastly, on
earth, high ground allows a permanent control over some strategic road or territory, a
choke point that interdicts all hostile traffic around it. In space, the so-called high
ground is a shifting Maginot line that is easily avoided, outwaited and circumvented.7
Aircraft have long performed elevated observation as well as air control and
ground strike missions. It is thus tempting to equate their demonstrated ability
to overcome ground defenses with that of spacecraft to do the same. However,
for missions in high-threat environments, various types of aircraft are grouped
in “packages” combining offensive and defensive capabilities as specifically re-
quired. Route selection, timing, and deception are keys to success, as are deliber-
ate unpredictability and maintenance of the initiative. Spacecraft, on the other
hand, are inherently predictable, and combinations of satellites are “new” to the
enemy only on the first orbit, after which they can be planned against and lose
the initiative. Again, few similarities seem to exist between air and space
vulnerabilities.
The multiplicity of potential threats posed to U.S. space-based systems is
highlighted in the Transformation Flight Plan itself. In addition to the
space-based weapons already described that have space control missions, several
terrestrial systems are also pertinent—such as the Ground Based Laser, which
would “propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit sat-
ellites to provide robust defensive and offensive space control capability.”8 Op-
ponents with mobile or hardened lasers could conduct speed-of-light attacks on
space-based systems at times of their choosing. The Air-Launched Anti-Satellite
Missile would “be a small air-launched missile capable of intercepting satellites
in low earth orbit.”9 Launching antisatellite weapons from aircraft could in-
crease the unpredictability of attack and provide additional kill mechanisms
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against our space-based systems. Opponents desiring to attack our space-based
capabilities in the future would seem to have plenty of options.
4 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
THE SPACE CONTEXT
Objects in space are governed by astrodynamics: “The speed and direction of
a satellite cannot be changed as easily as an aircraft’s, and enormous amounts
of energy are required to accomplish seemingly trivial changes in a satellite’s
altitude or orbital inclination” (Howard). The movement of objects in orbit is
highly predictable—the overwhelming majority of satellites carry fuel only for
minor maneuvers at slow accelerations. Orbits, once chosen as best suited to
the satellite’s missions, are rarely changed.
Low earth orbit (LEO) (150–800 km, or 90–500 miles) gives the best imag-
ery resolution but limits time above the horizon with respect to any given
point on earth and renders satellites vulnerable to attack or interference.
Geosynchronous orbits (GEO) (approximately 35,000 km/20,000 miles) have
periods equal to the earth’s rotation; a satellite observed from the earth ap-
pears to stay at or near the same longitude. GEO is excellent for weather ob-
servation, communications relay, and other tasks requiring continuous
hemispheric coverage from a single satellite. Beyond GEO lie high earth orbits
(HEO). Between GEO and LEO is the medium earth orbit (MEO) range. Highly
elliptical orbits can extend the time over a particular latitude.
The “clean,” clutter-free background makes objects in space easier to de-
tect. Attempts to hide from passive or active sensors operating at one fre-
quency can make detection by other sensors easier; as an example, painting a
satellite black to reduce reflections detectable to visible-light sensors would
cause it to become hotter and therefore emit long-wave infrared radiation de-
tectable by infrared sensors at even greater range. However, the transparency
of space is somewhat offset by its vastness; above the lowest earth orbits, tre-
mendous volumes must be searched to find satellites, let alone stealthy vehi-
cles deployed from satellites. “Space situational awareness,” as a result, may
be, in practical terms, a relative concept.
All elements of space systems—in space, on the earth, and in the link be-
tween them—have vulnerabilities. Ground sites are vulnerable to threats
ranging from mortar attack to software viruses; communications links are sus-
ceptible in varying degrees to jamming. The space segment suffers not only
from predictable movement but from fragility imposed by launch weight re-
strictions; “armor is heavy,” and a simple device “exploded in close [would
send] shrapnel through solar arrays, battery systems, onboard computers,
guidance systems, and sensors alike” [Kennedy et al.]. If timed correctly,
direct-ascent antisatellite weapons (ASATs) fired from earth “could disperse
something as simple as sand in LEO, leaving anything passing through it . . .
severely damaged or destroyed.” Space, ground, or air-based directed-energy
weapons could conduct attacks on fragile satellite components without
warning. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation generated by the
high-altitude detonation of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most devastating
threat, since “lingering effects of radiation could make satellite operations fu-
tile for many months” [Space Commission].
Sources: William E. Howard III, “Satellites and Naval Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (April 1988); Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
1999); U.S. Congress, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control;
Fred Kennedy, Rory Welch, and Bryon Fessler, “A Failure of Vision,” Airpower Journal 12,
no. 2 (Summer 1998); U.S. Air Force, Space Operations Doctrine; DeBlois, “Space Sanc-
tuary”; and Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization.
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Space-based weapons, like all space systems, are predictable and fragile, but
they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed—
leading to a strong incentive to use these weapons preemptively, to “use them or
lose them.” The problem is further complicated by the difficulty in knowing
what is occurring in space. As the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization pointed out:
Hostile actions against space systems can reasonably be confused with natural phe-
nomena. Space debris or solar activity can “explain” the loss of a space system and
mask unfriendly actions or the potential thereof. Such ambiguity and uncertainty
could be fatal to the successful management of a crisis or resolution of a conflict.
They could lead to forbearance when action is needed or to hasty action when more
or better information would have given rise to a broader and more effective set of re-
sponsive options.10
This lag in situational awareness can increase the effectiveness of attacks.
That is, striking first is likely to mean inflicting disproportionate losses on the
enemy; waiting increases the chances of suffering disproportionate losses
oneself.
SPACE-BASED WEAPON CONCEPTS: ADVANTAGES, ISSUES,
AND REACTION
If technical and fiscal challenges are overcome, there is little doubt that an inte-
grated combination of airborne, terrestrial, and space-based lasers with orbiting
relay mirrors would be a flexible weapons constellation. Striking at 186,000
miles a second, laser weapons and mirrors help overcome the problems posed by
the large distances and high speeds for targeting in and from space.11 Perhaps
they would be most effective at space control, but they would also be useful for
boost-phase intercept of ballistic missiles. This is a critical missile-defense func-
tion, particularly when dealing with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. If
not destroyed in boost, nuclear-tipped missiles may deploy decoys, and chemi-
cal or biological warfare payloads might be broken into small, separate
submunitions or canister reentry vehicles, each of which is a lethal weapon that
must be destroyed.12 In such cases there is a high likelihood that defenses would
be overwhelmed.
Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement (EAGLE)
Space-based systems would be logical for this important mission. By virtue of
the speed of the laser and its “ability to accurately place energy on targets that are
thousands of kilometers away,” a constellation would provide worldwide cover-
age against ballistic missile launch.13 EAGLE—which uses orbiting mirrors that
are effectively space-based weapons—might prospectively be just such a system.
H A R D E S T Y 4 9
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Its effectiveness, however, can only be gauged in terms of the probable reaction
of enemies.
A deployed EAGLE missile defense system by the United States would hold at
risk the ballistic missile assets of every other state. Even states with enough mis-
siles to overwhelm EAGLE if launched simultaneously would feel increased risk,
since a first strike might reduce their inventory below the size required to satu-
rate defenses. In that light, opponents might:
• Develop faster-burning missiles to reduce their period of vulnerability, or
harden the missiles to reduce the laser’s capacity
• Proliferate the missiles and their launchers to saturate the lasers
• Develop antisatellite capabilities against the lasers
• Shift force structure toward cruise missiles.14
The space-based segment of EAGLE would be highly predictable in its move-
ments. An attacker would know how large a salvo of ballistic missiles would have
to be to overwhelm the defenses and when coverage would be at a minimum.
Furthermore, the one or two EAGLE laser-defense platforms that would have
engagement opportunities during the boost phase of the missile salvo could be
attacked just before it was launched. Defensive sensors could be degraded using
relatively low-powered lasers or decoys, while space-based weapons platforms
were attacked by ground-based lasers, orbiting space mines, or fast-burning,
hardened, direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. In this way, with relatively
modest resources an enemy might overwhelm the extremely expensive EAGLE
boost-phase capability. A more sophisticated foe might deploy clusters of
space-based mirrors to use in conjunction with mobile or hardened
ground-based lasers. The mirror clusters could attack large segments of the U.S.
defensive system whenever they came over their targets’ horizon.
Given these vulnerabilities and initiative possessed by the attacker in a missile
attack, it seems unlikely that EAGLE could provide anything like assured boost-
phase intercept.
Space-Based Radio-Frequency Energy Weapon
A constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency (RF) trans-
mitters would be a flexible system that meets critical space-control needs. Dur-
ing recent congressional testimony, Peter Teets, Under Secretary of the U.S. Air
Force, highlighted the need to prevent foreign powers from targeting U.S. forces
and the “need to have capability to deny them the use of their space assets.”15
Power and modulation variations designed “to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide
variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems” would
likely provide a great deal of operational flexibility.16 In the prelude to combat it
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might jam or disrupt systems involved in targeting U.S. forces; during conflict,
operating at high power, it could destroy confirmed enemy systems.
Here again, the question of enemy reaction is critical. It seems likely that
given the U.S. reliance on space assets, once the United States deploys RF
space-control weapons, other nations will find it to their advantage to do the
same. However, their lack of detailed intelligence on target vulnerabilities may
drive them to different space-control solutions. An opponent might fall back on
an offensive concept, using large numbers of destructive weapons—again, with
a premium on first use.
Placing space mines in the immediate vicinity of high-value American satel-
lites would likely be a major component of an opponent’s strategy. These weap-
ons could be fairly lightweight and possess considerable range. “For example, a
directional fragmentation warhead similar to that of a Claymore mine could
project 100,000 one-gram pellets in a pattern that would cover a 100 x 100 meter
area with 10 pellets per square meter at a range of 1 kilometer.”17 One approach
to the space mine is to “design a very small stealth weapon that is moved into po-
sition over a long period of time” and in secrecy.18 However, while a stealthy
space mine has definite advantages, it is not clear that an unobserved approach is
required. In a fully weaponized space environment, U.S. space-based lasers and
mirrors, each capable of attacking satellites thousands of kilometers away,
threaten distant satellites as much as would a space mine in close proximity. In
any case, until space mines actually damaged or interfered with their victims, it
would be difficult to challenge their legitimacy. To attack or disable them as a
potential threat would set a precedent for preemptive strikes against U.S.
space-based weapons, if not all its satellites.
Thus, it is likely that other countries will respond to deployment of
space-based weapons by the United States with space-control programs of their
own. Lower-technology kinetic weapons may even be seen as attractive deter-
rents to the sophisticated, reversible effects preferred by the United States.
Would we jam a surveillance satellite, however important, if it meant having one
of ours destroyed by a space mine? Would we not be deterred by the prospect of
seeing the critical low-earth and geosynchronous orbital zones littered with the
debris of kinetic weapons? In this area, simplicity may offer advantages to the
opposition.
Hypervelocity Rod Bundles
As far as can be known from unclassified sources, Hypervelocity Rod Bundles
are similar to other proposed kinetic-energy weapons designed for use against
terrestrial targets. These weapons, frequently referred to as “eroding rods,” seek
“to destroy targets by converting the KE [kinetic energy] associated with the
H A R D E S T Y 5 1
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weapon’s high velocity (5 to 11 km/s [kilometers/second]) into work and heat. . . .
For example, a two-meter rod weighing 50 pounds and penetrating a depth of
six to eight meters is similar to detonating 50 pounds of explosive in a hole
slightly larger in diameter than the rod.”19 The destructive force of these weap-
ons is directed almost entirely in the path of the weapon’s travel; for this reason,
suitable targets include “tall buildings, missile silos, ships, and hardened aircraft
shelters.”20 Due to their extremely high speed and lack of vulnerable points, de-
fense against the rods “would be very difficult inside the atmosphere”; the best
approach might be finding and attacking them in space before the penetrator re-
entry burn is complete.21 For a constellation of eroding-rod space-based weap-
ons, trade-offs between total “delta” velocity (energy needed to deorbit), impact
velocity (destructive power), area coverage, and reentry angle suitable for accu-
racy seem to yield an optimum orbit altitude of around eight thousand kilome-
ters and a response time of 1.5 to two hours.22 Such a deployment would add to
U.S. global strike capabilities, with responsiveness better than that of current
manned aircraft, and some unique munitions effects.
Once again, however, enemy reaction must be considered. Space-based global
strike weapons would confer on hostile nations much greater increases in com-
bat power, in proportional terms, than they would for the United States. A
RAND study concluded that
because of their extremely high velocity, these [kinetic-energy] weapons are very dif-
ficult to defend against during their brief transit through the atmosphere and might
therefore be particularly interesting against heavily defended targets. These weapons
may be of only limited interest to the United States, which has other means of global
power projection. However, they may be a very good fit for another country, such as
one seeking global power projection without duplicating the American terrestrial in-
vestment or one seeking to deny access to U.S. power projection forces. For example,
instead of playing catch-up against highly evolved air and submarine defenses, a
country might prefer these space weapons to bypass the defense entirely.23
However, conventional ordnance from space could be significantly more re-
sponsive than even kinetic weapons. Because they do not require high terminal
velocities or steep reentry angles, they could be placed in lower orbits; as a result,
“the responsiveness of orbital basing can reasonably be about 20 to 30 minutes.”24
Space-basing precision weapons that are already available does not require high
technology. In fact, a “shape capable of carrying a large number of smart mu-
nitions might resemble a larger version of the original Discoverer/Corona film
return capsules.”25 The combination of global access, rapid response, and mod-
erate technological development could eventually make space-based strike
weapons the preferred choice of a number of countries.
5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Potentially hostile nations, however, are likely to concentrate instead on first
strike. Rather than distributing their space-based weapons evenly and at alti-
tudes optimal for consistent, worldwide response, they might cluster weapons-
delivery platforms in lower orbits so as to reduce response time available to
defenses and increase the probability of saturating them. Even a small number of
weapons so deployed would have periodic opportunities for attacks on large
numbers of targets. Potential enemies might also emphasize the survival of indi-
vidual weapons en route to targets—for instance, by firing, nearly simultaneously,
numerous submunitions that disperse even before reentry into the atmosphere.
In general, space-basing weapons would offer an enemy a number of interesting
targeting options. Even a small number of kinetic weapons could have a devas-
tating effect on space-launch or satellite-control facilities, large warships in port,
and sensors involved in space and missile defense. Large numbers of conven-
tional submunitions could attack military and economic targets across the con-
tinental United States. If the attack were preemptive, the chances of defeating it
or preventing extensive damage would be very low.
Even more disturbing are the targeting options if an enemy chooses
nonconventional means. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in orbit. However, “it is difficult to distinguish
space-based WMD from space-based non-WMD.”26 Once space-based weapons
become commonplace and munitions dispensers are placed in orbit, inspection
of their contents is next to impossible. Submunitions with biological payloads,
such as anthrax, would be very deadly even if intercepted by air defenses inside
the atmosphere. “A few kilograms of the spores delivered in an inhalable form
can cause extremely large numbers of fatalities in areas of high population den-
sity. Against that kind of a target area with that kind of lethality, precision deliv-
ery is not required, just widespread dispersal and rough timing relative to the
time of day and weather.”27 Kinetic-energy weapons could add to the destruction
by targeting such sites as nuclear containment buildings and missile silos. Given
current efforts to develop a missile defense system that removes the WMD threat
to the U.S. populace, a future with space-based weapons could be very unappeal-
ing indeed.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR SPACE-BASING WEAPONS
Basing weapons in orbit, then, will not be in the long-term interests of the
United States. Still, there are those who disagree. The two most commonly heard
arguments that full weaponization of space would be beneficial for the United
States are that it is inevitable, and that space is a “center of gravity” that the na-
tion must weaponize in order to protect. A third argument less frequently heard
H A R D E S T Y 5 3
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is that moving first to weaponize space would achieve complete dominance in
that domain and thus permanently secure U.S. national interests through a be-
nevolent hegemony.
U.S. Space Hegemony
Everett Dolman argues that the downsides of space-basing weapons can be
avoided by using current and near-term capabilities “to . . . seize military control
of low-Earth orbit. From that high ground vantage . . . space-based laser or kinetic
energy weapons could prevent any other state from deploying assets there, and
could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial enemy ASAT facilities.”28
Other states would be allowed to compete commercially in space with the
United States, but only after notification and approval of each launch.
Underlying this view and the arguments adduced in its support is the idea
that by seizing space the United States will have seized a vantage point from
which the earth itself can be dominated. This is the “ultimate high ground” ar-
gument, which, as we have seen, has serious weaknesses; it is not at all clear that
even in strictly military terms dominance in space means dominance on earth.
In fact, its benefits are likely to be both marginal and temporary if an enemy
shifts the terms of the engagement.
The more important questions would be the political and legal. The preemp-
tive destruction of another nation’s space-based weapon would be a direct viola-
tion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states that outer space “shall be free
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.”29 If
U.S. deployment of space-based weapons is a peaceful use of space under the
treaty, deployment by another state is protected as well. This is not in itself a
problem for space hegemonists, who advocate “withdrawing from the current
space regime” and announcing “a principle of free-market sovereignty in
space.”30 However, potential foes are not in the least likely to accept unilateral
American assertion of space dominance, negating as it would many countries’
deterrence strategies and implying permanent and irreversible asymmetric U.S.
advantage in space. In the absence of a direct threat to their existence, such as ex-
isted during the Cold War, it is unlikely that allies would accept it either. Both
would probably, as the United States does now, view “purposeful interference
with space systems” as “an infringement on sovereign rights.”31 Heavy political
and economic costs would likely be imposed on the United States, which is un-
likely to find the political will to uphold such a dramatic change in policy against
both friends and enemies.
A more limited approach, denying “rogue states” access to space, could also
be proposed. This could be construed as in accordance with the current National
Security Strategy objective to “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our
5 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction,” since it is difficult to
verify that there are no weapons of mass destruction on orbital space weapons
platforms, and even conventional space-based ordnance could attack such facil-
ities as nuclear power sites and so produce WMD-like effects.32 This concept
might be accepted internationally, or imposed unilaterally with acceptable po-
litical cost, against a state like North Korea, with a history of attacking its neigh-
bors, clear links to terrorist acts, a record of violating treaties, and an
authoritarian regime. Even this example poses problems, however. Debris from
a boost-phase EAGLE engagement of a missile launched from North Korea
would presumably not hit the United States, but other nations in the region
might be struck. It is not hard to envision the outcry should debris rain on Japan,
China, or Russia from a booster that North Korea claimed had been merely plac-
ing a communications satellite into orbit.
Other rogue state space “lockout” issues are even more problematic. Iran is
frequently quoted as a potential future threat to the United States, but it seems
almost certain that a space “lockout” against a country that has not attacked its
neighbors in recent history and has functioning democratic institutions would
cause a severe international backlash. Additionally, any deployment of
space-based weapons against a “rogue state” is likely to elicit space-based weap-
ons deployments by third parties. China is likely to be one of the first countries
to follow suit. The destabilizing aspects of space-based weapons would be par-
ticularly unhelpful in any future crisis over Taiwan. Thus, a decision to
space-base weapons should not be made under the illusion that it will result in
unilateral U.S. advantage. Some limited “lockout” from space of a rogue state
may be possible under certain circumstances, but the space-basing of weapons
in response by other states that could become enemies must be considered.
Space Weaponization Is Inevitable
The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization reported five major findings. One of these concerned the in-
evitability of weaponizing space:
Every medium of transport—air, land, sea—has seen conflict. Space will be no differ-
ent. . . . As with national capabilities in the air, on land, and at sea, the United States
must have the capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate
the hostile use of space against American interests.
Explicit national security guidance and defense policy [are] needed to direct develop-
ment of doctrine and concepts of operations for space capabilities, including weap-
ons systems that operate in space and that can defend assets in orbit and augment
current air, land, and sea forces. This requires a deterrence strategy for space, which
in turn must be supported by a greater range of space capabilities.33
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The report cites no background analysis supporting this rather dramatic
chain of logic. The argument seems to be, first, one of historical determinism—
that other mediums having seen conflict, space will as well. That inevitability re-
quires not only defense of assets in space but negation in advance of the hostile
use of space. The final leap is to the idea that these offensive and defensive re-
quirements can be met only by “weapons systems that operate in space.” No po-
tential disadvantages or possible alternatives are noted.
As for the inevitability argument, Dr. Karl P. Mueller concludes that argu-
ments based on human nature or historical analogies to the air and sea are
“thought-provoking but ultimately weak.”34 They do not account for the fact
that though some nations continue to possess banned chemical and biological
weapons, there is no clamor in the United States to deploy such weapons in such
large numbers on the ground that their further spread is inevitable. “Perhaps
most strikingly of all, even among space weapons advocates one does not find
voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is inevitable based
on the rule that weapons always spread.”35 The analogy to the medium of air also
has significant holes. Less than fifteen years after the first powered flight, mili-
tary aircraft were carrying out reconnaissance, offensive and defensive
counterair, and strategic and tactical bombing missions. In contrast, over
forty-five years after Sputnik, space-based counterspace and terrestrial bom-
bardment is not being conducted, long after the technical capability emerged.
“In fact, both superpowers did develop anti-satellite interceptors, but then
abandoned their ASAT programs, something utterly without precedent in the
history of air power that casts further doubt on the soundness of the analogy.”36
If a decision to space-base weapons should not rest solely on arguments of
historical inevitability, it is possible to argue that weaponization of space will oc-
cur at some time in the future. When humans ultimately explore deep space,
they may indeed carry weapons for protection. A powerful weapons system may
ultimately be deployed to protect the earth from asteroids. “Ultimately” is a long
time. However, it is not long-term predictive accuracy that is important but the
almost complete irrelevance of “inevitability” to current efforts. Things that are
inevitable can be either good or bad. If something is good and inevitable, it is
logical to pursue acquisition now in order to obtain the benefits as early as possi-
ble; if something is inevitable and bad, it is logical to delay it as long as possible.
Thus, our current decisions with regard to space-basing weapons must be dic-
tated not by its inevitability but by whether it is good or bad—by whether
weaponization and its consequences will improve or degrade the national secu-
rity environment. If analysis points to overall degradation, U.S. policy should be
to delay the introduction of space-based weapons: “Even if weaponization of
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space is ultimately inevitable, like our own deaths, why should we rush to em-
brace it?”37
There is, nonetheless, an inevitability-based argument that is more strongly
supported by history—that once a nation deploys weapons that provide an ad-
vantage, other nations will build similar weapons or find asymmetric ways to
avoid their effect. Britain’s introduction of the dreadnought battleship at the be-
ginning of the last century, with its combination of heavy guns, armor, and
speed, caused in Germany “something close to panic.”38 However, this revolu-
tion in warship effectiveness did not forever solidify Britain’s hold on the seas.
Only four years later, in 1909, it was the British who were in a panic, over the
rapid buildup of dreadnoughts by Germany;39 the new concept, by making pre-
vious ships almost irrelevant, was allowing Germany to overtake British naval
power much more quickly than would otherwise have been possible. History is
filled with other examples: chemical weapons, atomic bombs, multiple inde-
pendently targetable reentry vehicles, etc.; it is difficult to think of a single
counterexample, even when the original innovator had the clear capability to
maintain a numerical lead.
Worse, space-based weapons differ in important ways from the dreadnoughts
of the early 1900s. First, as we have seen, space-based weapons are not individu-
ally robust under attack, nor can they be hidden in port; instead, they are fragile
and always exposed to attack. Additionally, in the 1900s a nation needed almost
as many expensive dreadnoughts as the enemy fleet had to have a chance of
wresting from it control of the sea. In the twenty-first century, high-technology
space-based lasers and mirrors may be able to destroy many satellites before the
attack is even detected. Even low-technology space mines and global-strike
weapons can destroy high-technology satellites and ground facilities if em-
ployed first. Finally, because of these less expensive alternatives, American tech-
nical and industrial capacity advantages will not ensure the security in space
that it would have at sea a century ago. Even if the United States deploys space-
based weapons first, its supremacy in space would not be “inevitable.”
The Space “Center of Gravity” Must Be Protected
A former director for Space Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
outlines the essential “center of gravity” argument:
The contributions of space forces to the success of U.S. military operations and the
importance of space activities to the economy may make the medium a military and
economic “center of gravity” for the nation. A center of gravity . . . is a point of vul-
nerability where an attack may be decisive for the course and outcome of war. . . .
Space has emerged as an area of vital interest to the United States because of its im-
portance to national and economic security.40
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This argument emphasizes the criticality of space to the military and eco-
nomic interests of the United States: in view of the “hundreds of billions of dol-
lars of national treasure invested in space activities that are woven into the fabric
of the nation’s society and economy, the U.S. armed forces will be expected to be
vigilant and ready to protect space as an area of vital national interest.”41
But is space truly an economic “center of gravity”? A thousand satellites in ten
years at an investment of a half-trillion dollars may sound large, but against an
eight-trillion-dollar annual gross domestic product, a half trillion dollars in a
decade is less impressive, on the order of 3 percent of the gross domestic product
of the private service sector.42
Additionally, the explosive growth of fiber-optic cable has brought a relative
decrease in commercial importance of satellite communications. Total satellite
communications capacity in 2000 was approximately 130 gigabits per second
(Gbps). In contrast, 1999 cable capacity was approximately 329 Gbps, and it ex-
panded to approximately 11,942 Gbps by 2000.43 By 2003 the worldwide com-
mercial satellite broadband capacity had reached approximately 160 Gbps, with
a projected increase of 60 percent over the next ten years; however, in the same
year a throughput of 160 Gbps was demonstrated over a single frequency of a
single fiber-optic cable.44 While satellites will continue to be important to com-
mercial communications, it seems difficult to argue that they are a “center of
gravity” requiring substantial portions of the defense budget to protect.
In any case, space-based weapons would dramatically increase the vulnerabil-
ity of the commercial assets they would be meant to defend. The most economi-
cally significant satellites are communications platforms in geosynchronous
earth orbits (GEO). The projected demand for commercial satellites in GEO
over the next ten years is 211, compared to only forty-eight in nongeo-
synchronous orbits.45 Global Positioning System satellites, on which commer-
cial communications and transportation systems are increasingly dependent for
timing and navigation signals, are also in high, semisynchronous orbits.
Ironically, space-based weapons would place satellites in these higher orbits
at greater risk than they are now. Currently, sheer distance provides protection
from direct-ascent ASATs and the effects of nuclear detonations in low earth or-
bit (LEO). Even earth-based directed-energy weapons powerful enough to at-
tack LEO satellites would need hundreds of times more power to threaten
geosynchronous orbits.46 Fairly modest hardening could even further reduce the
physical vulnerability of these satellites and, more importantly, their links. How-
ever, no amount of hardening could protect them from space mines following in
similar orbits or from kinetic ASATs in retrograde orbits—which, by attacking
any geosynchronous satellite, would place others in the geosynchronous belt at
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grave risk of collateral damage. Deploying space-based weapons to protect even
a true commercial “center of gravity” would be self-defeating.
The second element of the “center of gravity” argument is that space must be
protected as vital to the U.S. military. However, “sound military judgment has
often led military strategists to eliminate a COG’s [center of gravity’s] vulnera-
bility rather than require them to protect it.”47 It is not “space” that must be pro-
tected but the vital functions of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
communications, and navigation. The medium in which they are performed is
not the key. It is the ability to support military forces while simultaneously deny-
ing those functions to the enemy that “will enable combatant commanders and
operational forces to think and react faster than an adversary and thereby dictate
the timing and tempo of operations.”48
ALTERNATIVES
Given the notable and inherent vulnerabilities of space assets, huge investments
in pursuit of total space dominance in an attempt to shield these vulnerabilities
may not be the most intelligent approach. Better to seek alternative, terrestrial
ways to augment and enhance the key services provided from space. Space assets
would continue to perform their critical functions, but alternate systems would
provide redundancy even under attack. This approach offers even greater advan-
tages if the alternatives operate in usefully different and, in important respects,
superior ways. When both systems are available, synergy would produce mark-
edly better support than either could offer alone. To deny service entirely, an en-
emy would have to conduct successful, simultaneous attacks in two distinct
mediums; the difficulty and uncertainty involved might prevent opponents
from even making the attempt. In such a “system of systems,” terrestrial assets
might do much more to protect space assets than could any space-based
weapon.
C4ISR Mission Alternatives
Numerous options for “C4ISR”—command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—as well as for navigation
are available to augment space-based assets (see sidebar). The most logical ISR
architecture would fully integrate the relevant capabilities of satellite, un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV), and manned systems—capitalizing on their indi-
vidual strengths and increasing overall performance through networked
integration at the machine-to-machine level. Satellites, for instance, possess an
inherent advantage in peacetime access; further, and though full coverage is epi-
sodic and predictable, satellites can provide ISR across the breadth of foreign na-
tions. If hostilities are initiated, satellites become vulnerable to attack, but it is at
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precisely this time that U.S. conventional superiority enables penetration of en-
emy airspace by manned and unmanned aircraft. UAVs can approach closest to
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C4ISR ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Architectures that fully integrate the capabilities of satellites, manned and un-
manned airborne platforms, and ground-based facilities could provide both
superior performance and vital redundancy in the major missions typically en-
visioned for satellites—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
communications; and navigation.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAVs) are likely to assume an increasing share of ISR responsibili-
ties.“Specially designed UAVs have long loiter time, can be positioned flexibly
near potential targets, and are small and relatively difficult to detect.” Global
Hawk offers a sixty-five-thousand-foot operating altitude, thirty-six-hour en-
durance, and an integrated suite of electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) and syn-
thetic aperture radar/moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) sensors. In 2002, the
Department of Defense foresaw three major trends for UAV sensors: “(1) mi-
gration of video to high-definition television standards, accompanied by au-
tomated precision geolocation; (2) increasing use of synthetic-aperture radar
(SAR) and moving-target indication (MTI) modes to provide all-weather,
high-resolution, wide-area situational awareness/cueing; and (3) a combina-
tion of foliage-penetration (FOPEN) radars with hyperspectral imagery (HSI) to
detect and identify targets in deep hide” (quoted in Hewish). A tiered, net-
worked constellation of UAVs could be fielded that included high-altitude,
wide-area-surveillance UAVs working with medium and low-altitude tactical
UAVs employing EO/IR and range-gated laser radars. It could support U.S.
forces even if most space-based ISR assets were lost. UAVs, however, are not
without limitations—primarily cost, large-bandwidth communications, and
low combat survivability.
Communications and Navigation The U.S. military is already highly de-
pendent on space for communications and navigation. Growing information
requirements and the introduction of bandwidth-intensive systems like UAVs
are increasing this reliance. The Department of Defense is developing
Transformational Communications System (TCS), a new laser-based architec-
ture that will provide extremely high bandwidth between satellites and high-
altitude airborne platforms. This truly transformational capability will increase
reliance on space-based communications; the vast majority of communica-
tions satellites, being in GEO orbits, are relatively invulnerable to direct attack
from earth, but they could be attacked, as could Global Positioning System
(GPS) navigation satellites in MEO orbits, by space-based weapons.
Complements and alternatives to space-based communications and navi-
gation capabilities include fiber-optic cable, which could provide cheap, ex-
tremely large-bandwidth access to fixed forward military assets.
Communications with mobile military ground and air assets will likely be
conducted via radio frequency (RF) transmission. Alternatives to satellite RF
relay include manned aircraft and UAVs, which offer increased flexibility, re-
duced relay time, and lower power requirements. One option being explored
is to install relay capability on current large manned aircraft with other pri-
mary duties. A family of Scalable, Modular, Airborne, Relay Terminals
(SMART) has been tested on tanker aircraft. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) is examining the use of scalable, modular nodes that
support both communications relay and signals intelligence from a variety of
airborne platforms. The Army is considering mounting radios in its current
tactical UAVs to provide a “tactical internet node.”
Even the unique advantage of geosynchronous satellites will soon be chal-
lenged, by a High Altitude Airship (HAA) program. The HAA is to fly at seventy
thousand feet, carry a payload in excess of four thousand pounds, and, using
onboard propulsion and GPS navigation, maintain a geostationary position
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for over a year. Various missions and payloads are envisioned, including com-
munications broadcast and relay, in addition to the original focus on
wide-area air and maritime surveillance of continental U.S. coasts and the
southern border. An HAA, no more than three hundred miles from its ground
users, would not suffer the “time-late” problem inherent in the 22,000-mile
round trip to geosynchronous orbit. A system linking HAA and satellite via la-
ser communications would be highly flexible and robust indeed.
Military forces and weapons, as well as civilian infrastructure, are becom-
ing increasingly reliant on GPS navigation and timing. While the GPS constel-
lation has the vulnerabilities of any MEO-based satellite, terrestrial jammers
are the greater threat, as they can be small, cheap, and relatively easy to de-
ploy. Again, complementary systems are available. The Global Positioning Ex-
periment (GPX), conducted by DARPA, and the U.S. Air Force’s UAV Battlelab
have demonstrated the ability of airborne “pseudo-satellites” (pseudolites) to
generate high-power signals—forty-five decibels above those from the satel-
lites themselves—that burn through anti-GPS jamming.
There would be military options even were GPS to be completely denied.
The Army’s Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) provides a
network of up to a hundred kilobytes per second with a navigation accuracy
of fifteen meters circular error probable. Similarly, the Link-16 tactical data
link has a “relative navigation” (RELNAV) that improves navigation resolution
in a GPS-denied environment, potentially at accuracies that equal or exceed
that of the current GPS system. Reliance on GPS for precision bomb delivery
could be greatly reduced with such low-cost seeker technology as the Direct
Attack Munitions Affordable Seeker (DAMASK), which has already demon-
strated accuracies to within one meter without GPS. Finally, navigation receiv-
ers compatible with non-GPS satellite navigation signals (like Galileo and
GLONASS) would provide redundancy and multiply the number of navigation
systems an enemy would have to attack.
Suborbital and Space Vehicles The Suborbital Operations Vehicle (SOV)
and Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV) are under study. The SOV is a hypersonic
vehicle that, launching and recovering in the continental United States,
would “pop up” to exoatmospheric altitudes. There it would release an SMV,
which would boost itself to orbit, where it would either release low-cost ISR
satellites or collect data itself—it could pass over any given point on earth
within an hour.
Sources: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Joint Operations Superiority in the
21st Century; David B. Glade, The Technological Arsenal: Emerging Defense Capabilities
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2001); Mark Hewish, “Unmanned, Unblink-
ing, Undeterred,” International Defense Review, 1 September 2002; Greg Jaffe, “Mili-
tary Feels Bandwidth Squeeze as the Satellite Industry Sputters,” Wall Street Journal, 10
Apri l 2002; Global Security.org, Transformational Communication Study,
www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/tcs.htm; Rhonda Siciliano, “ROBE Test Success-
ful; ‘Smart Tanker’ One Step Closer,” USAF AFMC, www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/
PA/centennial/archive/news/story51.htm, and Airborne Communications Node, avail-
able at www.darpa.mil/ato/programs_ACN.htm; Phillips Business Information Corpora-
tion, “TRW Developing Payload to Demonstrate UAV-Based Communications Relay,” C4I
News, 15 August 2000; High Altitude Airship (HAA) FY03 ACTD brief, 28 June 2003,
available at www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/barbb/downloads/fy03actd.ppt; Report of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organi-
zation; John Sheridan, “GPS Jamming Still a Major Concern,” Aviation International
News, www.ainonline.com/issues/03_02/03_02gpsjammingpg66.html; “Enhanced Po-
sition Location Reporting System (EPLRS) Fact Sheet,” Raytheon, www.raytheon.com/
products/eplrs/ref_docs/eplrs.pdf; National Research Council, Naval Forces’ Capability
for Theater Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press/Naval Study
Board, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, 2001); Small Diameter Bomb/Small
Smart Bomb, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm;
and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Upgrades, at www.globalsecurity.org/military/
systems/munitions/jdam-upgrade.htm; “Transformational Communication Study,”
Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/tcs.htm, p. 1.
17
Hardesty: Space-Based Weapons—Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternat
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
targets, under cloud cover, thereby providing optimal sensor performance when
target obscuration or angular resolution is an issue. UAVs and manned plat-
forms are unpredictable threats, complicating the enemy’s cover and conceal-
ment efforts. Sensor integration from all ISR systems would enhance situational
awareness and allow rapid localization and suppression of threats to either me-
dium. Perhaps most importantly, such networked systems would eliminate
space-based ISR as a critical vulnerability, successful attack on which could pre-
vent U.S. victory.
As with ISR, space-based communications and navigation systems, while
providing key functions, also have terrestrially based alternatives and comple-
ments. Further, the vast majority of communications satellites are in
geosynchronous orbits and, as we have seen, would be much more vulnerable if
space-based weapons were deployed nearby; GPS navigation satellites in me-
dium earth orbits would suffer similarly. Thus, the argument that defense of
military space assets requires space-based weapons is particularly weak for com-
munications and navigation satellites.
Alternatives to Space-Based Weapons
The USAF Transformation Flight Plan itself lists numerous alternative systems to
perform the missions also proposed for space-based weapons. The Hypersonic
Standoff Weapon and Hypervelocity Missile concepts would allow conventional
aircraft to attack on time-critical targets at ranges out to a thousand nautical
miles in less than thirty minutes.49 The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) program
will “be an unpowered, maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle . . . able to
strike a spectrum of targets, including mobile targets, mobile time sensitive tar-
gets, strategic relocatable targets, or fixed hard and deeply buried targets.”50
CAVs could be employed from a number of expendable or reusable platforms,
including ballistic missiles, with responsiveness that matches that of
space-based kinetic weapons.
The unique weapons effects of space-based eroding rods can also be achieved
from ground-based systems. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can
produce impact velocities of seven to eight kilometers per second, about the
same as in kinetic attacks from low earth orbit.51 Eroding-rod penetration capa-
bility is a function of rod length: “As long as the rod impacts at a velocity in ex-
cess of 3 km/s, the depth it penetrates depends exclusively on the composition of
the target and the rod, with only slight differences among specific hard target
materials.”52
Similarly, non-space-based space-control weapons are available. Electronic
jamming and blinding can largely negate enemy satellite communications, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance. These efforts can be ground or air based.53 The
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Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile and terrestrially based components of EAGLE
would contribute significantly, and computer attack could prevent information
dissemination. In any case, current American conventional capabilities and for-
ward basing already provide a tremendous relative advantage against hostile
space systems—specifically, against ground-based telemetry, tracking, and com-
manding support sites, downlink reception sites, product-delivery communica-
tions systems, and launch infrastructure. If space-based weapons remain
prohibited during peacetime, competition initiated during hostilities to place
weapons in space would highly favor the nation with superior conventional
strike capabilities and strategic depth—that is, the United States.
Satellite vulnerability and the negation options described above make satel-
lite protection a particularly challenging aspect of space control, even if
space-based weapons are prohibited. A “near-peer competitor” with ASAT capa-
bilities is highly likely to disable at least some U.S. space assets in low earth orbit.
An important portion of the protect function identified in the U.S. Space Com-
mand’s Long Range Plan comprises, therefore, reconstitution and repair.54 A flexi-
ble launch mechanism with both inexpensive, partly capable and full-capability
replacement satellites could continue essential space missions in spite of losses.
Under this construct, after suffering damage to major systems the United States
would immediately launch low-cost replacement satellites to restore partial ca-
pability, while unmanned aerial vehicles would augment ISR throughout the
hostile nation as identified threats to satellites were attacked. This concept is
very similar to “Operationally Responsive Space” efforts already under way.55
Boost-phase ballistic missile interception is extremely difficult regardless of
the medium from which it is conducted; here again, however, there are alterna-
tives to space-based weapons. The airborne and ground-based laser compo-
nents of EAGLE could be augmented with “airship relay mirrors” operating at
up to seventy thousand feet.56 This arrangement could be effective in confronta-
tions with countries the size of North Korea, but coverage for larger countries,
and countermeasures that might be available to them, remains a concern. Other
options include ground or air-based high-speed missile interceptors. Mounting
such an interceptor on a stealthy, high-altitude, high-endurance UAV would be
costly, but perhaps it “would be no more expensive, and would be more techni-
cally feasible, than a system which relies on orbital weapons.”57 The possibility
that stealth UAVs are in the area could prove more unsettling to a potential at-
tacker than space-based systems, which can be planned against.
Some analyses cast doubt upon the likelihood that any boost-phase intercept
systems could be deployed before countermeasures made them ineffective. The
American Physical Society recently concluded that neither interceptors nor air-
borne lasers were likely to be useful against solid-propellant ICBMs, which are
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more heat resistant and burn faster, reducing engagement time lines.58 While
some of the study’s assumptions are open to challenge, there is little doubt that
terrestrially based boost-phase intercept against high-end ICBM threats would
be challenging.59 Space-based systems, however, suffer similar drawbacks. The
same study calculated that over 1,600 space-based interceptors would be re-
quired to eliminate a single solid-propellant ICBM, requiring “at least a five-to
ten-fold increase in the current annual U.S. launch capacity.”60 Additionally,
most potential countermeasures to and limitations of airborne lasers also apply
to space-based laser systems.
Conventional superiority and forward basing provide numerous alternatives
having comparable capabilities, in terms of both responsiveness and effect, to
space-based weapons. Further, these alternatives confront potential enemies
with both conventional superiority and strategic depth.
THE ARMS-CONTROL OPTION
Evidence and analysis show, then, that deployment of space-based weapons will
negatively impact U.S. national security—the combination of exploiting alter-
native capabilities and preventing deployment of space-based weapons repre-
sents for the United States the best chance of maintaining and increasing its
military advantage. What, then, is the next step?
In the long run, it is unlikely that American self-restraint alone would prevent
other nations from pursuing space-based weapons. Some country will eventu-
ally calculate that space-based weapons provide unique capabilities or leverage,
probably against U.S. dominance. That prospect makes necessary an arms-
control regime.
Past arms-control treaty failures, “notably, the Versailles Treaty[,] resulted in
part from a failure to devise effective verification arrangements and policies for
response to noncompliance.”61 However, verification of a space-based weapons
treaty is greatly assisted by the considerable (and highly detectable) energy re-
quired to place anything in orbit. Additionally, the relatively low number of
space launches and sites, the technical adequacy of current inspection technol-
ogy, low cost of inspection, and the possibility of delaying the launch if clarifica-
tion is needed all suggest that the prospects are good for high-confidence
verification of any space-based weapons treaty. 62
There must be a mechanism for response to noncompliance. While most na-
tions would desire to maintain peace, avoid destabilization, and preserve space
for peaceful use, rogue states pursuing narrow interests may view weapons in
space as a source of leverage over the United States or other nations. While inter-
national consultation would be required, unilateral action when a state believes
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a space-based weapon threatens it should be allowed for. This alone should en-
sure that all states would assure the international community, particularly the
major powers that could interdict a satellite system, of the treaty-compliant na-
ture of their space vehicles. A state refusing to comply could expect rapid coun-
teraction. “Surgical” elimination of an apparently threatening platform in the
isolation of space is more likely, and therefore more credible, than the strikes on
a state’s homeland that might be necessary to counter violation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, or the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
While some in the United States inherently distrust arms control, sometimes
it is in the nation’s interest. The WMD threat has led the current administration
not only to call for compliance with the biological and chemical weapons con-
ventions but for strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
Missile Technology Control Regime.63
Unfortunately, the required analysis and decisions have not been made, nor are
they in sight—but a national policy with regard to the space basing of weapons
is needed now. American leverage to negotiate a favorable treaty will fade over
time, and system decisions are currently being made based on presumptions
about future environments. In recent congressional hearings, Undersecretary
Teets stated that Air Force trade studies are under way to determine if the new
Space Based Radar should be in low or medium earth orbit.64 Its results could be
radically different depending on whether its authors assume the presence of de-
fensive counterspace assets or of no space-based weapons at all. Without a co-
gent policy on space-based weapons, billions of dollars could be spent in a less
than optimal manner.
In the military planning process, a mission is refined, friendly and enemy
strengths and weaknesses are compared, vulnerabilities are analyzed, and cen-
ters of gravity are determined. Potential enemy courses of action are then devel-
oped and war-gamed against various friendly options, and the best option is
selected. This process recognizes that the enemy’s actions are half of any military
equation—a reality that, unfortunately, the strongest advocates of space-based
weapons appear to have neglected. They have failed to examine even all available
friendly courses of action, concentrating instead on “stovepiped,” space-centric
capabilities.
Before the nation moves forward to develop space-based weapons, it must
conduct a thorough military analysis. The U.S. Strategic Command is a logical
agent for this critical task.65 The military analysis should then feed a larger policy
debate, with increased emphasis on diplomatic and fiscal factors. But wherever
and however it occurs, the debate must fully consider the long-term strategic
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implications of space-based weapons and potential alternatives to them. To proceed
with space-based weapons on any other foundation would be the height of folly.
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